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POLICE CHECKPOINTS: LACK OF 
GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT 
CONTRIBUTES TO DISREGARD OF CIVIL 




Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general 
interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such 
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.1 
 
During the summer of 2008, crime in the Trinidad neighborhood of the 
District of Columbia was at an all time high and, in the eyes of top law 
enforcement brass, was only getting worse.  In response to the rising crime 
rate, city leadership authorized a wide variety of law enforcement sweeps in 
the area, all of which proved ineffective.  Reluctantly, the decision was 
made to set up police checkpoints around the neighborhood. 
The constitutionality of the police checkpoints was challenged in 
federal court that summer.  Despite a favorable ruling in district court, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the military-
style checkpoints set up to combat the city’s gun violence problem were 
unconstitutional.  The appellate court found that the city’s administrators 
had ignored Supreme Court guidance that has limited when, where, and 
how police checkpoints may be used in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution. 
 
∗ J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 2005.  I would like to thank the editors of the 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, and in particular Kristen Jones, for assistance, 
insight, and guidance throughout the drafting and revision process.  I would also like to 
thank William, Pauline, Marilee, Chantale, and Rebecca, for their unwavering 
encouragement and support.  
1 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). 
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This Comment argues that the Supreme Court has failed to provide the 
type of guidance necessary to ensure that officials in high-crime areas 
refrain from instituting unconstitutional police checkpoints in the face of 
increased criminal activity.  The Supreme Court’s guidance regarding 
police checkpoints has been sufficiently vague to encourage city 
administrators to authorize checkpoints of questionable legality in the face 
of rising crime.  Accordingly, the protections of the Fourth Amendment in 
cities across the United States are at risk. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine armed police officers surrounding your neighborhood and 
pulling over every approaching vehicle without any individualized 
suspicion of guilt.  Each driver is questioned regarding his purpose in 
driving into the neighborhood.  Each driver is also forced to disclose the 
contact information of his friends, family, and associates in the 
neighborhood—information that is then verified and entered into a police 
database.  Only those drivers who the police deem as having a legitimate 
purpose for entering the neighborhood are allowed to continue on to their 
final destination.  For those who fail to comply, a local jail cell awaits. 
If you live in an area of the United States where the crime rates are 
high or rapidly rising, such tactics may soon find a place in a neighborhood 
near you.  In the summer of 2008, the leaders of one major American city 
authorized the enforcement of such tactics—tactics that one more 
commonly associates with military zones in war-torn cities like Baghdad 
and Kabul.  The American city that instituted these tactics, which were 
considered essential elements of a police checkpoint program authorized by 
city officials, serves as the capital of the United States: Washington, D.C.  
The first U.S. court that considered the constitutionality of these 
checkpoints found them reasonable and justifiable under the Constitution.2  
More recently, a panel of judges on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit held that the checkpoints are, in fact, unconstitutional.3 
In their opinions, both the district and appellate courts analyzed the 
constitutionality of Washington’s police checkpoints by applying tests 
created by the Supreme Court.  While this Comment argues that the D.C. 
Circuit’s proper application of the tests resulted in the correct conclusion, it 
acknowledges that the current tests advocated by the Supreme Court make 
that conclusion debatable.  However, this conclusion should not be up for 
debate and would not be if the Supreme Court modified or replaced its 
 
2 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008). 
3 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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current, deeply flawed tests for assessing the constitutionality of police 
checkpoints. 
A.  FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE D.C. POLICE CHECKPOINTS 
In the summer of 2008, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department (MPD) established Neighborhood Safety Zones (NSZ) to 
combat the city’s growing gun violence problem.4  The District’s top brass 
had decided that enough was enough, particularly in the Northeast 
neighborhood known as Trinidad.5  In the preceding year, the neighborhood 
had witnessed an inordinate amount of violence involving firearms.6  
Several of these incidents resulted in homicides and as many as six 
involved the use of automobiles.7 
On June 7, 2008, in response to the aforementioned events and a triple 
homicide involving a juvenile victim that took place on May 31, 2008, the 
MPD, under the authorization of Special Police Order SO-08-06, designated 
a portion of Trinidad as an NSZ.8  The MPD installed eleven vehicle 
checkpoints over the course of five days at locations around the zone’s 
perimeter.9 
According to an article in the Washington Post, the checkpoints would 
stop vehicles approaching the 1400 block of Montello Avenue NE, a section of the 
Trinidad neighborhood that has been plagued with homicides and other violence.  
Police [would] search cars if they [suspected] the presence of guns or drugs, and 
[would] arrest people who [did] not cooperate, under a charge of failure to obey a 
police officer . . . .10 
In addition, vehicles were only allowed to enter the Trinidad neighborhood 
if police officers determined, after questioning the driver, that he had a 
“legitimate purpose” for entering the NSZ.11  The checkpoints were to be 
enforced at random hours for at least five days, though they could be 
extended to ten days according to the police under Special Order 
SO-08-06.12 
 




7 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 50. 
8 Id. at 50-51.   
9 Id. 
10 Allison Klein, D.C. Police to Check Drivers in Violence-Plagued Trinidad, WASH. 
POST, June 5, 2008, at A14. 
11 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
12 Id. at 50. 
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The Special Order, which governed the conduct of the officers 
conducting the checkpoints, listed a variety of “legitimate” reasons for 
entry.13  MPD officers staffing the checkpoints stopped 951 vehicles and 
denied entry to 48 on account of either the operator’s failure or refusal to 
provide a “legitimate reason” for entry.14  The MPD officers were 
authorized to request identification and proof of the reason for entry in 
order to “‘verify the accuracy of the reason.’”15  Failure to provide a 
“legitimate reason” was not a criminal offense in itself, and those who were 
denied entry or that chose not to provide it were allowed to park their cars 
and enter the NSZ on foot.16  For vehicles denied entry into Trinidad, 
officers were instructed to record the “operator information, vehicle 
description, vehicle tag number, and reason for denial.”17  Even for vehicles 
granted entry, officers were instructed to record the tag number and reason 
for entry.18  The District has admitted that much of this information was 
entered into a law enforcement database, for reasons unknown as of this 
point.19 
On July 18, 2008, the MPD issued a revised Special Order regarding 
the NSZ.20  The core aspects of the program and procedures were not 
changed.21  However, the revised Special Order required that no data 
gathered at NSZ checkpoints from that point on was to be entered into any 
District of Columbia law enforcement electronic database.22 
The following day, July 19, 2008, Chief of Police Cathy Lanier 
authorized a second NSZ in Trinidad.23  These checkpoints were 
presumably in response to multiple shootings earlier that day by individuals 
 
13 Id. at 51.  The Special Order lists the following “legitimate” reasons for entry: 
1) The person resides in the NSZ; 
2) The person is employed in the NSZ or is on a commercial delivery; 
3) The person attends school or a day-care facility, or is taking a child to, or picking up a child 
from, a school or day-care facility in the NSZ; 
4) The person is a relative of a person who resides in the NSZ; 
5) The person is seeking medical attention, is elderly, or is disabled; and/or 
6) The person is attempting to attend a verified organized civic, community or religious event 







20 Id. at 52. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  The MPD has not revealed its motivation for making this change. 
23 Id. 
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allegedly firing from automobiles.24  More than six people were shot, 
including a thirteen-year-old boy who later died.25 
On July 24, 2008, Chief Lanier extended the second NSZ for five days 
in response to information the police had received indicating that further 
violence involving automobiles might be imminent.26  Following the 
extension, another revised Special Order was issued, but none of the core 
aspects of the revised Special Order were materially altered.27 
B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF 
POLICE CHECKPOINTS IN TRINIDAD 
As mentioned previously, the checkpoints were instituted by the police 
in an attempt to combat a spike in the number of homicides in the District, 
which rose 7% in 2007 after several years of decline.28  Chief Lanier noted 
that the checkpoints “served as a fence to keep violent criminals out of 
Trinidad” rather than as “nets to capture evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing.”29  City officials downplayed the significance of the initiative, 
noting that the MPD had used various checkpoints in the past.30  In fact, 
while the use of checkpoints to surround a neighborhood was a new policy, 
the MPD had maintained a long-standing practice of using police 
checkpoints (referred to as roadblocks) for the purposes of general crime 
control and data collection.31 
Responding to the threat of a potential legal challenge to the 
checkpoints, Interim D.C. Attorney General Peter Nickles cited a New York 
case he believed provided legal support for the checkpoints, Maxwell v. City 
of New York.32  In Maxwell, New York City police were authorized to stop 
motorists in the Bronx at random hours, mostly in the evening, to curtail 
drive-by shootings, drug trafficking, and robberies.33  Neighborhood 
residents and commercial vehicles were allowed to pass while others were 
 
24 Michael Birnbaum, Paul Duggan & Valerie Strauss, Checkpoints Resume After Spate 
of Violence, WASH. POST, July 20, 2008, at C1. 
25 Id. 
26 Elissa Silverman, Trinidad Checkpoints: Anti-Violence Effort to Be Extended, Chief 
Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2008, at B4. 
27 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
28 Allison Klein, Killings in D.C. up After Long Dip, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2008, at A1. 
29 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing Declaration. of Cathy L. Lanier ¶ 4, June 27, 
2008). 
30 Brian Westley, Police Plan Car Checkpoints in D.C. Neighborhood, HOUS. CHRON., 
June 6, 2008, at A13. 
31 Allan Lengel, Safety Stops Draw Doubts: D.C. Police Gather Nonviolators’ Data, 
WASH. POST, May 2, 2005, at B1. 
32 102 F.3d 664 (2d Cir. 1996). 
33 Id. at 666. 
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turned away.34  A federal appeals court ruled in 1996 that those police 
tactics were constitutional, saying that the checkpoints were reasonably 
viewed as an effective mechanism to reduce drive-by shootings.35 
Even with the legal support found in Maxwell, Nickles believed that 
the District of Columbia had “gone the extra mile” to make sure that the 
roadblocks passed constitutional muster.36  He assured the public that 
officials had tried all other reasonable means to stop the killings, including 
flooding the area with police officers.37  Yet, on June 20, 2008, the 
Partnership for Civil Justice, a Washington-based public interest law firm, 
filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia seeking an injunction against the MPD’s NSZ 
checkpoint program.38  
The plaintiffs alleged that the roadblock program instituted by the 
MPD authorized unconstitutional suspicionless seizures of persons traveling 
on public roadways in the District of Columbia.39  All of the plaintiffs in the 
suit, except for one, were denied entry to Trinidad in their vehicles on 
account of their refusal to provide certain information.40  On October 30, 
2008, Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia denied the preliminary injunction request because the plaintiffs 
had demonstrated neither a substantial likelihood that the checkpoint 
program was unconstitutional nor the necessary irreparable harm.41 
On July 10, 2009, approximately one year after the installation of the 
first set of NSZ checkpoints, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court and granted a preliminary injunction on the basis that the 
Trinidad checkpoints were likely to be held unconstitutional.42 
C.  WOULD THE SUPREME COURT AGREE? 
It is difficult to determine whether the Supreme Court would agree 
with the opinions of the district court or the D.C. Circuit regarding the 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 668. 
36 Westley, supra note 30, at A13. 
37 Id. 
38 Del Quentin Wilber, Class Action Filed Over Checkpoints: Rights Group Calls Police 
Activity in Trinidad Neighborhood Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, June 21, 2008, at B2. 
39 Id. 
40 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2008).  The one plaintiff who was not 
denied entry, William Robinson, resided in the Trinidad neighborhood at the time of the 
complaint.  He, however, alleged that he was told by an officer at a checkpoint that he could 
not proceed to his house in his vehicle without providing identity information, which he 
refused to do. 
41 Id. at 64. 
42 See Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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constitutionality of the NSZ checkpoints.  Part II of this Comment explores 
how the Supreme Court has dealt in the past with police checkpoint cases 
that implicate the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protections.  Part III 
considers Judge Leon’s district court opinion refusing to grant a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting further use of NSZ checkpoints.  This section also 
scrutinizes the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, examining how it came to a different 
conclusion than the district court. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the tests used by the Supreme Court to 
judge the constitutionality of police checkpoints are deeply flawed, that the 
Court’s current lack of effective guidance poses a substantial risk to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, and that a new “strict scrutiny” test 
should be applied to police checkpoints.  Given recent developments in this 
area of the law, the Supreme Court must clarify or correct its position.  The 
fundamental rights of U.S. citizens are at stake. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable 
government searches and seizures.43  Since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, courts have struggled with the question of how to apply the privacy 
rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to drivers of automobiles.44  
This Part examines how the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court as it applies to automobile searches and seizures, 
specifically when they occur at police checkpoints. 
A.  DISCRETIONARY STOPS BY THE POLICE UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that, when a vehicle is 
stopped at a police checkpoint and the vehicle’s passengers are detained, a 
“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment occurs.45  The result is the same 
even when the stop is limited in purpose or brief in duration.46 
 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
44 See David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 565-66 (1998).  
45 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (“It is well established 
that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (“[A] 
Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“[C]heckpoint stops are ‘seizures’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
46 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (“The Fourth Amendment 
applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention 
short of traditional arrest.”). 
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In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court considered whether 
discretionary stops by individual patrolmen were constitutional.47  A 
patrolman pulled over a driver to check his license and registration without 
observing a traffic violation or suspecting other illegal activity.48  The Court 
held that unless definite suspicion exists that a driver has committed an 
unlawful act, stopping a vehicle and detaining a driver for the purpose of 
checking his license and registration violates the Fourth Amendment.49  The 
Court concluded that the danger of a patrolman abusing his discretion is 
greater than any marginal benefit the stops might produce for roadway 
safety.50  This conclusion was consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
bedrock principle that no seizure should occur without individualized 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 
Despite the Prouse Court’s articulation that the Fourth Amendment 
demands individualized suspicion to conduct a seizure, over the years the 
United States Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to the 
individualized suspicion requirement. 
B.  THE FIRST EXCEPTION: BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINTS 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte is the seminal police checkpoint case 
that began the carving out of exceptions to the individualized suspicion 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to facilitate automotive-
related crime control.51  In Martinez-Fuerte, the defendants were drivers of 
automobiles stopped at permanent checkpoints set up along roads that led 
away from the U.S.-Mexico border.52  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
because the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits were in 
conflict regarding the constitutionality of the use of checkpoints to police 
the nation’s borders.53 
The checkpoints were located on thoroughfares frequently traveled by 
vehicles coming from the border.54  Each vehicle was inspected, and those 
drivers that, as determined by the police, required additional inquiry were 
pulled out of traffic.55  Each of the original defendants in Martinez-Fuerte 
 
47 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
48 Id. at 650. 
49 Id. at 663. 
50 Id. 
51 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
52 Id. at 546-47. 
53 Id. at 551. 
54 Id. at 546. 
55 Id. 
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had been arrested for transporting illegal aliens, which in each instance had 
been discovered upon further inquiry at the checkpoint.56 
After reviewing the facts, the Supreme Court held that routine stops at 
permanent border checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.57  
The decision was significant given that the Court had consistently held in 
the past that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by 
consent or probable cause.58  The Court held that the need to make routine 
checkpoint stops near borders is great, particularly in light of the flow of 
illegal aliens and drug smuggling across the Mexican border.59  The Court 
also noted that the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is limited.60 
The Court’s majority recognized the dissent’s concern that the decision 
might erode Fourth Amendment protections as envisioned by the Framers.61  
Accordingly, the holding in Martinez-Fuerte is limited to border control 
checkpoints.62 
C.  THE BROWN REASONABLENESS TEST 
Three years after Martinez-Fuerte, the Court faced another Fourth 
Amendment case that would prove highly influential for years to come, 
particularly in the realm of police checkpoint jurisprudence.  In Brown v. 
Texas, two police officers spotted the defendant as he walked away from 
another man in an alley.63  The police officers admitted that they did not 
suspect him of any specific misconduct.64  Regardless, they stopped the 
defendant and demanded that he identify himself and explain what he had 
been doing in the alley.65  The defendant refused to cooperate and was 
arrested.66 
 
56 Id. at 546-50. 
57 Id. at 566-67. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 555-56. 
60 Id. at 558 (noting that the stops involved only a “brief detention of travelers during 
which ‘all that [was] required of the vehicle’s occupants [was] a response to a brief question 
or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United 
States’”). 
61 Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is the ninth Term marking the 
continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”). 
62 Id. 
63 443 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1979). 
64 Id. at 49. 
65 Id. at 48-49. 
66 Id. at 49. 
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The defendant claimed that his seizure violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.67  The Court considered whether it was reasonable for police to seize 
an individual absent individualized suspicion of criminal activity.  The 
Court developed a test that weighed “the gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public 
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.”68  The 
Court found that the public interest concerns in preventing crime are great, 
but the concerns are not great enough to demand that an individual identify 
himself when he is not suspected of committing a crime.69  The Brown test 
has since been relied upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in almost every 
major ruling regarding police checkpoints.70   
D.  THE SECOND EXCEPTION: SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS 
The next major Supreme Court police checkpoint case was Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz.71  In Sitz, the Supreme Court considered 
whether Michigan’s use of sobriety checkpoints violated the Fourth 
Amendment.72  The sobriety checkpoints were set up at selected sites along 
state roads, and officers would briefly stop all vehicles that passed in order 
to examine the drivers for signs of intoxication.73  If signs of intoxication 
were detected, then, as in the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, the cars would 
be taken out of traffic for further inspection.74  Typically, the police 
inspected the driver’s license and registration and, if necessary, conducted 
additional sobriety tests.75 
The case came to the Supreme Court after motorists filed a complaint 
in Michigan courts against the state police department alleging that 
checkpoints conducted with the purpose of combating drunk driving violate 
the Fourth Amendment.76  Relying on the Brown reasonableness test, which 
requires courts to weigh the public concern against the severity of the 
intrusion, the majority in Sitz upheld the sobriety checkpoints as 
constitutional.77  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a sharply divided 
 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 51. 
69 Id. at 52. 
70 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004); Mich. Dep’t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
71 496 U.S. at 444. 




76 Id. at 448. 
77 Id. at 455. 
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Court, held that a sobriety checkpoint is justified.  The Court reasoned that 
the state’s interest in preventing drunk driving, and the extent to which the 
checkpoint program could reasonably be found to advance that interest, 
outweighs the minimal degree of intrusion upon motorists who are briefly 
stopped.78 
E.  GENERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICE CHECKPOINTS: THE 
INTRODUCTION OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST 
In a somewhat surprising decision, given the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Court placed a limitation upon 
police checkpoints in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.79  In Edmond, the 
Court dealt with a challenge to Indianapolis’s use of vehicle checkpoints to 
search automobiles for drugs.80  City officials were worried that motorists 
were bringing narcotics into Indianapolis.81  They hoped that police 
checkpoints would prove more effective in curbing narcotics trafficking 
than the prior techniques relied upon by city officers.82  The officials 
figured that they could set up reasonable checkpoints to deal with their drug 
problem that would pass constitutional muster, much like earlier Court-
approved checkpoints that had dealt with the problems of drunk driving and 
illegal immigration.83 
The Indianapolis Police Department adopted very specific guidelines 
that were to be followed by police officers administering the checkpoints.84  
The vehicle checkpoints were manned with approximately thirty police 
officers.85  The officers would pull over a group of passing cars for 
inspection, and the rest of the traffic on the road would proceed as usual.86  
Officers would approach each vehicle, inform the driver that he had been 
stopped at a drug checkpoint, and ask for his driver’s license and 
registration.87  The officer would check for impairment and conduct a visual 
inspection from outside the car.88  A narcotics dog would also walk around 
 
78 Id. 
79 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
80 Id. at 34. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 34-36. 
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the vehicle.89  Any further inspection before letting the driver go would 
require consent or particularized suspicion.90 
In Edmond, the Court framed the dispositive issue as being whether 
highway checkpoints with the “primary purpose” of discovery and 
interdiction of vehicle passengers possessing illegal narcotics are 
constitutional.91  In an opinion delivered by Justice O’Connor, the Court 
noted that it was unwilling to limit the purposes that might justify a 
checkpoint program to any “rigid set of categories.”92  The Court, however, 
also concluded that it could not approve a program whose “primary 
purpose” is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.93  
The Court noted that, in the previous instances in which the Fourth 
Amendment particularized-suspicion requirement was suspended, the 
primary purpose of the checkpoints was closely tailored to the specific 
problems of patrolling the border or maintaining safe highways.94  The 
Court found that in Edmond, the purpose of “drug interdiction” was too 
closely related to Indianapolis’s general interest in crime control and the 
city’s checkpoints organized under this purpose required individualized 
suspicion in order to be constitutional.95 
F.  ILLINOIS V. LIDSTER: THE LATEST SUPREME COURT CASE TO 
CONSIDER POLICE CHECKPOINTS 
In Illinois v. Lidster, the Supreme Court faced another police 
checkpoint dilemma.96  In this case, however, the police officers were not 
stopping cars in order to detect or deter criminal wrongdoing by the drivers 
themselves; instead, officers were stopping cars for the sole purpose of 
obtaining information about a hit-and-run driver on the loose.97  Joseph 
Pytel was hit and killed by a car while riding his bike in August 1997, and 
the driver of the vehicle that hit him left the scene without identifying 




91 Id. at 40. 
92 Id. at 44. 
93 Id. at 44. 
94 Id. at 41. 
95 Id. at 48. 
96 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
97 Id. at 421. 
98 William Grady, Obituaries, Joseph L. Pytel, 70, Postal Worker, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 
1997, at 5. 
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effort to obtain more information about the driver, police set up the 
checkpoints in question.99 
Robert Lidster was the manager of a local pet store who was not 
involved in and had no material knowledge regarding Pytel’s accident.100  
Lidster did, however, encounter the checkpoint while driving under the 
influence.  After being briefly questioned, he nearly hit a police officer 
while attempting to drive his car away from the checkpoint.101  Noting 
Lidster’s erratic driving, the police officer who had nearly been hit 
requested Lidster’s license and registration.102  The officer smelled alcohol 
on his breath, had Lidster perform sobriety tests, and subsequently arrested 
Lidster for driving under the influence.103 
The Court’s decision in this case is particularly interesting considering 
the outcomes reached by the two Illinois appellate courts that heard the case 
in the wake of the Edmond decision.  At the trial court level, Robert Lidster 
was convicted by a jury of his peers.104  The Illinois Appellate Court 
reversed the conviction, finding that it was “impossible to escape the 
conclusion that the roadblock’s ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of 
‘ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’”105  The appellate court acknowledged the 
possibility that an emergency situation might justify a roadblock for crime 
control, but it concluded that this was “the type of routine investigative 
work that the police must do every day and does not justify the 
extraordinary means chosen to further the investigation.”106  In using the 
Brown reasonableness test criteria, the appellate court also concluded that 
the public interest in the acquisition of evidence of a prior crime did not 
outweigh the intrusion on the rights of innocent motorists.107 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the trial court ignored 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Edmond, which it interpreted as 
prohibiting the use of police checkpoints to advance the general interest in 
crime control.108  The court reasoned that allowing such informational 
 
99 Lidster IV, 540 U.S. at 422. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 422. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 421. 
105 People v. Lidster (Lidster II), 747 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 421-22. 
108 People v. Lidster (Lidster III), 779 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (Ill. 2002). 
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roadblocks could potentially make police checkpoints a “routine part of 
American life.”109 
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
overturned the rulings of the Illinois courts.  The Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the use of motorist checkpoints that are 
authorized for the purpose of requesting information from vehicle 
occupants about a previously committed crime.110  Justice Breyer refused to 
accept the lower courts’ conclusion that the checkpoint in Lidster had been 
used to prevent “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” like the checkpoint in 
Edmond.  The police checkpoint in question in Lidster was for 
informational purposes, not general crime control, which after Edmond 
continues to be per se invalid.111 
After determining that the “informational” primary purpose of the 
Lidster checkpoints is valid under Edmond, the Court moved to the Brown 
reasonableness test.112  The Court deemed the stops to be constitutional as 
the public interest in solving the crime is great, the methods used by the 
police are effective, and these factors outweigh the concern over 
interference with individual liberties as a result of the stops.113 
III.  IN THE WAKE OF THESE DECISIONS: DISCUSSION OF 
THE CONSITUTIONALITY OF NEIGHBORHOOD ZONES IN  
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
It is clear that the Supreme Court has not said that police checkpoints 
are per se unconstitutional.  Various exceptions have been carved out of the 
individualized suspicion requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to 
permit police checkpoints that facilitate automotive-related crime control 
(such as border checkpoints, sobriety checkpoints, and Lidster-type 
informational checkpoints).114  Still, Judge Leon’s district court opinion in 
Mills v. District of Columbia, which upheld the D.C. checkpoints, was 
startling for its outcome.  The facts of the case strongly support a 
conclusion that the primary purpose of the checkpoints was to serve the 
general interest in crime control.  Consequently, like the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals, this Comment argues that his ultimate decision was not faithful 
to Supreme Court precedent or the Constitution. 
 
109 Id. at 860. 
110 Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 427-28 (2004). 
111 Id. at 426. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See id.; Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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The district court’s decision in Mills is to be commended in one sense: 
Judge Leon attempted to apply faithfully the Supreme Court’s tests to the 
facts in front of him.115  This is a significant undertaking given that the 
Justices of the Supreme Court themselves have been inconsistent in the 
application of the tests.  Nevertheless, this Comment argues that, because 
the primary purpose of the D.C. checkpoints was to serve the “general 
interest in crime control,” the district court’s opinion was correctly reversed 
on appeal. 
A.  THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE D.C. POLICE CHECKPOINTS  
A vehicle checkpoint program’s “primary purpose” is a question of 
fact that must be assessed at the programmatic level.116  Lower courts have 
been cautioned that “finding the primary or predominant purpose will often 
prove difficult,” and the courts must take into account all available 
evidence.117  Furthermore, courts should not “probe the minds of individual 
officers” acting at the checkpoints, but rather they should look beyond the 
specific circumstances of any one checkpoint in determining the 
“programmatic purpose.”118 
In Mills, the district court, in determining the “primary purpose” of the 
checkpoints, looked to the Special Orders issued, the Trinidad NSZ 
authorizing documents, declarations from Chief Lanier, and the factual 
circumstances of the Trinidad checkpoints themselves.119  Judge Leon 
dispensed with the argument that the programmatic purpose of the police 
checkpoints was to “detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” 
which is per se unconstitutional after Edmond.120  Instead, according to 
Judge Leon, the purpose of the checkpoints was not to detect evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing but to deter violent crime facilitated by the use of 
automobiles.121  This difference in purpose made the D.C. checkpoints 
distinguishable from those used in Edmond.122 
Accordingly, the primary purpose test in Mills turned on whether a 
“primary purpose to deter violent crime of a specific type is sufficiently 
distinct from the District’s general interest in crime control.”123  Since the 
 
115 See Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008). 
116 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
117 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (citing United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 979 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001)). 
118 Id. (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48). 
119 Id. at 55-56. 
120 Id. at 57. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. (emphasis added). 
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primary purpose was “sufficiently distinct” from the District’s general 
interest in crime control, the checkpoints were held to be constitutional.124  
The court reasoned, “Indeed, because the NSZ checkpoint program 
explicitly does not seek to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing, or 
apprehend those committing criminal acts, the program’s primary purpose 
is clearly distinct from the District’s ‘general interest in crime control,’ as 
that phrase was employed in Edmond.”125 
The district court’s reasoning is dangerous as far as the Fourth 
Amendment is concerned.  A primary purpose of deterring gun violence (or 
even drive-by shootings) should still fall under the “general interest in 
crime control.”  If the courts were to sanction all police checkpoints for the 
simple fact that they were preventative in nature and sought to “deter rather 
than detect” ordinary criminal wrongdoing, then the primary purpose test 
would pose little challenge at all.  In time, the Fourth Amendment 
exceptions would inevitably swallow the rule, given that preventative police 
checkpoints would trump the constitutional protections from police 
intrusions conducted without suspicion.  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit 
realized the inherent danger in the district court’s application of the primary 
purpose test.  The appellate court repudiated the district court’s reasoning, 
concluding that if the courts adopted the primary purpose test as envisioned 
by Judge Leon, then all preventative police checkpoints would be 
sanctioned as long as they proved reasonable.126  The D.C. Circuit was 
unwilling to accept the narrow reading of Edmond’s “general interest in 
crime control” standard urged by the district court.  The appellate court 
shared the fear of other courts that such an application of the primary 
purpose test could lead to police checkpoints becoming a “routine part of 





126 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
127 See People v. Lidster (Lidster III), 779 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Ill. 2002) (commenting on 
the potential for police checkpoints to become routine parts of American life). 
128 It must also be noted that the district court’s reliance on the Maxwell case was 
misplaced, and it is telling that Judge Leon did not mention this in his opinion.  Maxwell was 
decided before Edmond in a tribunal that is not binding on the District’s courts.  See 
Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664 (2d Cir. 1996).  In fact, I would argue that 
Edmond effectively overturned Maxwell. 
The argument can be made that the police checkpoints considered in that case would 
today be deemed unconstitutional checkpoints whose primary purpose was to serve the 
general interest in crime control.  Id. (finding that the checkpoints in Maxwell were utilized 
to curtail drive-by shootings and drug trafficking, which presumably fall under the umbrella 
of “ordinary criminal wrongdoing” or the “general interest in crime control”). 
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B.  REASONABLENESS OF THE D.C. NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY ZONES  
The district court in Mills held that the circumstances that led to the 
implementation of the NSZ were grave, the methods that were used by the 
MPD were effective, and the intrusion imposed by the checkpoints on the 
District’s drivers was minimal.129  The D.C. Circuit did not address the 
reasonableness of the checkpoints after determining that the primary 
purpose of the checkpoints was unconstitutional. 
Although the district court’s primary purpose analysis was faulty, it is 
difficult to argue with the court’s reasonableness analysis under the current 
tests available—particularly with regard to the gravity of the public concern 
and the effectiveness of the checkpoints.  Gun violence is of the highest 
concern in Washington, as in other American cities, and during the time in 
which the police checkpoints were in effect, there were no reported 
incidents of automobile-related gun violence in the area.130 
As for the level of intrusion, it was held that the plaintiffs in Mills had 
not established a substantial likelihood that the NSZ checkpoints’ intrusion 
on individual liberty was so great that it outweighed the interests the NSZ 
checkpoints advanced.131  The district court argued that both the objective 
and subjective intrusiveness of the checkpoints were minimal and that the 
level of discretion afforded the officers conducting the checkpoints was 
limited.132  This aspect of the district court’s analysis deserves more 
attention and is discussed in the next Part. 
IV.  THE END OF THE ROAD FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS: 
CAUSE FOR CONCERN FOR DRIVERS IN HIGH-CRIME AREAS 
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the 
expectation of privacy in an automobile and the right to operate an 
automobile freely differ from the expectation of privacy and freedom in 
 
Judge Leon did not make this argument.  In fact, he cited to the case in persuasive 
fashion.  See Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (noting that checkpoints, like those in Maxwell, 
which were utilized to deter drive-by shootings “served an important public concern,” 
similar to the D.C. checkpoints).  This was an interesting development, because if Maxwell 
continues to be cited as good law, then the legal community must question the continued 
viability of the Edmond case as a binding opinion.  Maxwell and Edmond arguably cannot 
coexist as reliable precedent. 
129 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59-62. 
130 Id. at 59-60. 
131 Id. at 62. 
132 Id. at 60-62. 
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one’s home.133  As a result, Fourth Amendment analysis of searches and 
seizures of homes has differed from that of searches and seizures of cars.134  
Unfortunately, the idea that a driver should have a “lower” expectation of 
privacy while in his car has been exaggerated and exploited.  Consequently, 
city and police administrators today can develop police checkpoint 
programs that, despite being highly intrusive, easily survive judicial 
scrutiny.  The Fourth Amendment, as it applies to the expectation of 
privacy in automobiles, has lost its teeth, and the judicial system must 
restore its relevance before it is too late.  The following sections touch on 
several reasons why the Fourth Amendment’s protections are in danger, 
particularly in high-crime areas like the Trinidad neighborhood of 
Washington, D.C. 
A.  THE PRIMARY PURPOSE AND BROWN REASONABLENESS TESTS 
ARE DEEPLY FLAWED 
The primary purpose and Brown reasonableness tests are deeply 
flawed, though courts currently rely on both to determine the 
constitutionality of police checkpoints.  Moreover, the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts inconsistently apply the tests.135  Police checkpoints will 
and should continue to be challenged until the Supreme Court develops 
better standards or sufficiently outlines the criteria that it considers most 
important in judging the constitutionality of police checkpoints.  The 
 
133 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s 
expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly 
different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”). 
134 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-53 (1925).  Indeed, it can be argued 
that this distinction in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was made far earlier, as the 
Supreme Court suggested in Carroll that 
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has 
been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary 
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a 
proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or 
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the 
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be 
sought. 
Id. at 153 (emphasis added). 
135 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419 (2004); People v. Lidster 
(Lidster III), 779 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 2002).  In the Lidster proceedings, the Illinois Appellate 
Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court sharply differed on what is considered to be a primary 
purpose which serves the “general interest in crime control.”  These differences have yet to 
be addressed, and the Supreme Court has yet to identify what it considers the “general 
interest in crime control.”  Consequently, the constitutionality of checkpoints, like those in 
D.C., remains difficult to determine. 
2010] Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance 617 
following subsections examine the major flaws in both tests as they have 
been applied by the courts. 
1.  The Application of the Primary Purpose Test Is Open to Interpretation 
and Therefore Has Been Applied in an Inconsistent Fashion 
The primary purpose test created in Edmond has arguably shifted the 
focal point in checkpoint litigation.  In today’s courts, considerable 
deference is shown to city and police officials with regard to the 
authorization and operation of police checkpoints.  Past Supreme Court 
precedent has illustrated that it is almost a foregone conclusion that the 
checkpoints will be deemed reasonable.136  Authorized checkpoints are 
assumed to address a grave public concern in an effective manner while 
only minimally intruding on the civil liberties of the common citizen.  As a 
result, courts are now focusing more heavily on the government’s purpose 
for resorting to checkpoints, as opposed to the manner in which the 
checkpoints are conducted.137  This approach is partly the result of the 
relative weakness of the Brown reasonableness test.138  Considering this 
shift in emphasis, to ensure the rights protected in the Fourth Amendment, 
courts must apply a legitimate primary purpose test, and the test’s 
fundamental flaws must be addressed. 
i.  First Flaw: The Edmond Language Has Been Misinterpreted, Leading to 
a Shallow, Insufficient Analysis of the Programmatic Purpose of 
Challenged Checkpoints 
The first major flaw in the primary purpose test as it is currently 
applied is a product of the evolution of the test since Edmond.  In Edmond, 
the Court stated that when a programmatic purpose of the police 
checkpoints is to detect “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” then the 
checkpoints are per se unconstitutional.139  That language was strictly 
 
136 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53-55 (2000); see also Lidster IV, 
540 U.S. at 427-28.  In the two major Supreme Court checkpoint cases that have been 
decided since the advent of the primary purpose test, the Court has dedicated the majority of 
its opinions to the discussion of the checkpoint programs’ primary purpose.  In Edmond, 
where the checkpoint program was struck down, the dissenting Justices of the Supreme 
Court indicated that the checkpoint program was clearly reasonable and thus constitutional.  
They saw the primary purpose test as a tool which would be utilized by lower courts to strike 
down police checkpoints which would clearly be reasonable and thus constitutional under 
Brown. 
137 See generally, e.g., Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008).  
138 For further discussion of the Brown reasonableness test, see infra Part IV.A.2. 
139 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42. 
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construed by Judge Leon.140  Consequently, minor linguistic manipulation 
of the documents that authorize a checkpoint program by law enforcement 
officials create police checkpoints that survive judicial scrutiny.141  More 
specifically, if the programmatic documents specify that the checkpoints are 
to “deter” criminal wrongdoing or to “gather” information regarding a 
crime rather than to “detect” wrongdoing, then the programmatic purpose is 
justifiable under Judge Leon’s version of the test.142 
The key to passing the test, however, should not be whether the 
primary purpose of a system of police checkpoints is deterrence rather than 
detection of criminal wrongdoing.  Fortunately, the D.C. Circuit recognized 
this flaw in the district court’s reasoning.143  The fundamental rights 
provided by the Fourth Amendment should not be so easily overcome by a 
play on words by a clever legislator.  This is not to say that a police 
checkpoint that serves as a deterrent should be presumptively 
unconstitutional.  Both border checkpoints and sobriety checkpoints 
arguably have as major goals the prevention of drunk driving and illegal 
immigration, respectively.144  Yet, courts must dig deeper than the 
legislative language of the authorizing documents when attempting to 
decipher the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint program. 
ii.  The Second Flaw: The Supreme Court Has Failed to Articulate Which 
Police Objectives Fall Under the “General Interest in Crime Control” 
Umbrella 
The second major flaw in the primary purpose test stems from the 
Supreme Court’s failure to indicate what comes under the umbrella of the 
“general interest in crime control.”  Given the outcome in Edmond, we can 
be assured that the detection of drug trafficking is considered by several 
 
140 See Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (holding that the D.C. checkpoints can be 
distinguished from those prohibited under Edmond because their primary purpose is not to 
make arrests or to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, but rather to deter 
persons in motor vehicles from entering the NSZ to commit crime). 
141 Id. 
142 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004); Mills I, 584 F. 
Supp. 2d at 57-58.  Both of these cases illustrate the weakness of the primary purpose test.  
The courts in each case placed far too much emphasis on the language of the documents 
which authorized the checkpoints in determining the “primary purpose” of the checkpoints.  
The danger of relying on this authorizing language is that courts will be easily manipulated 
in the future, as the authorizing language may state that the purpose is to “gather 
information” when the underlying purpose is to, in fact, detect ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing. 
143 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
144 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990) (noting the 
importance of deterring drunk driving); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-
56 (1976) (noting the importance of deterring illegal immigration). 
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Justices to be a “general crime control” objective, but we can be assured of 
little else.145  This is a flaw that must be cured in order to ensure that city 
officials only resort to the authorization of police checkpoints when a 
special governmental interest is identified. 
In Edmond, Justice O’Connor argued that, despite the “severe and 
intractable nature of the drug problem,” the Indianapolis checkpoints were 
not justifiable.146  She understood the checkpoints to be simply a tool for 
police to “pursue their general crime control ends” in a fashion which did 
not pass constitutional muster.147  Yet, she did not indicate any other 
checkpoint objectives that might be classified as impermissible “general 
crime control” law enforcement techniques. 
In Mills, the district court made a point of arguing that the phrase 
“general interest in crime control” does not refer to every law enforcement 
objective.148  Consequently, the court concluded that the phrase did not 
encompass the specific deterrence of automobile-related gun violence 
encountered in the nation’s capital.149  Of course, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals disagreed with Judge Leon’s district court opinion, holding that the 
D.C. checkpoint’s primary purpose was to pursue the general interest in 
crime control. 
Given the ambiguity surrounding the phrase “general interest in crime 
control,” it remains unclear whether the district court or the appellate court 
properly interpreted the Supreme Court’s views regarding justifiable 
primary purposes for checkpoint programs.150  It is clear, however, that if 
the Supreme Court were to provide categories of impermissible police 
checkpoint justifications or a list of justifications that would come under the 
heading of “general interest in crime control,” the Court would go a long 
way towards resolving this question.  The lack of clarity in determining 
what is considered the “general interest in crime control” will undoubtedly 
continue to be a problem in checkpoint litigation until the Supreme Court 
attempts to resolve it. 
iii.  Third Flaw: The Primary Purpose Can Be Deceiving and Difficult to 
Decipher 
The primary purpose examination has a third flaw: police departments 
may erect roadblocks under the guise of conducting sobriety checkpoints, or 
 
145 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). 
146 Id. at 42. 
147 Id. at 43. 
148 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 57 (D.D.C. 2008). 
149 Id. 
150 See Mills II, 571 F.3d 1304, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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gathering information regarding past activities, or even simply deterring 
gun violence, when the true underlying mission of the checkpoints is to 
detect other criminal activity.  While this statement illustrates an undeniably 
cynical view, how are the courts supposed to be able to decipher the actual 
purpose of the checkpoints? 
Take, for example, the NSZ checkpoints.  The appellate court chose to 
overturn the district court’s opinion on the grounds that the programmatic 
purpose of the checkpoints was too closely related to “general crime 
control.”151  Under the primary purpose test, as it is currently applied, the 
issuance of a revised Special Order with several linguistic changes would 
allow the checkpoints to pass constitutional muster.  For instance, the 
checkpoints could be tied to roadway safety or traffic regulation instead of 
the deterrence of gun violence.  In Mills, the D.C. Circuit noted that while 
deterrence of drug activity and gun violence are forbidden primary purposes 
under Edmond, traffic regulation remains a permissible primary purpose for 
suspicionless checkpoints.152 
It is only a matter of time before city officials facing rising crime rates 
attempt to authorize checkpoint plans under deceptive guises that might 
persuade the courts to deem the checkpoints constitutional.  Indeed, given 
the level of violent crime involving the use of automobiles in Washington, 
D.C., it would be difficult to make the argument that the sobriety 
checkpoints in Sitz are more justifiable in eliminating the “immediate, 
vehicle-bound threat to life and limb” than any D.C. checkpoints aimed at 
roadway safety.153  This emphasis on the legislative language of checkpoint 
plans—language which can easily be manipulated by legislators to “pass” 
the Supreme Court’s test—places Fourth Amendment in danger. 
iv.  What the Supreme Court Can Do to Save the Primary Purpose Test 
The Supreme Court must clarify the parameters of the primary purpose 
test if it is to be relied upon in future checkpoint litigation.  If the Court 
does so, perhaps the test will be applied by lower courts so that only certain 
special governmental needs, which are distinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control, justify police checkpoints.  Justice O’Connor 
noted that she was unwilling to identify a bright-line rule or “rigid 
categories” that would limit the types of crimes that would justify 
 
151 Id. at 1312. 
152 Id. 
153 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39, 43 (2000) (noting that Sitz sobriety 
checks were “aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk 
drivers on the highways and there was an obvious connection between the imperative of 
highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue”). 
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reasonable police checkpoints.154  She noted that the Fourth Amendment 
would permit an “appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an 
imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to 
flee by way of a particular route.”155  This Comment does not deny that 
these considerations are valid.  It does argue, however, that the Court 
should be more transparent with respect to which checkpoint justifications 
are not sufficient under the test or are too closely linked to the general 
interest in crime control.  Given the way that the doctrine has evolved since 
Edmond and the manner in which lower courts have applied the test, it may 
be time to rethink Justice O’Connor’s reluctance to specify certain 
categories of criminal activity that are indistinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control. 
2.  The Increasingly Low Threshold to Pass the Brown 
Reasonableness Test Must Be Addressed 
Although the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals chose not to address the 
reasonableness of the NSZ checkpoints after determining that the primary 
purpose of the program was unconstitutional, courts in most checkpoint 
cases use the Brown reasonableness test after determining that the primary 
purpose is justified.156  “The reasonableness of seizures at vehicle 
checkpoints” under Brown is assessed by weighing: “1) the gravity of the 
public concern served by the checkpoints; 2) the degree to which the 
checkpoints advance the public interest; and 3) the severity of the 
checkpoints’ interference with individual liberty.”157  The test is inherently 
flawed because it undervalues individual liberty interests when balancing 
such interests against the public interest goal.  The test, as it is currently 
applied, does not sufficiently protect Fourth Amendment rights. 
Courts have maintained that the gravity of the public concern may 
reduce an individual’s liberty interest, but that “the gravity of the threat 
alone [is not] dispositive of questions concerning what means law 
enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.”158  Despite 
this proclamation, when government officials have provided a rational 
reason for instituting police checkpoints and adequately warned drivers 
about the checkpoints, the checkpoints have survived the Brown 
reasonableness test.  The test has a very low threshold—an assertion 
 
154 Id. at 44. 
155 Id. 
156 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004); Mich. Dep’t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
157 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 59 (D.D.C. 2008). 
158 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
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supported by the government’s high success rate in proving the 
reasonableness of intrusive checkpoints in the thirty years since Brown.159 
The following discussion highlights the flaws in the Brown 
reasonableness test, with a special focus on the problems associated with 
the “effectiveness” and “intrusiveness” prongs of the test.  This discussion 
also examines how courts assess the reasonableness of police checkpoints 
used in high-crime areas like Trinidad. 
i.  Gravity of Public Concern 
The first factor considered under the Brown test is the gravity of the 
public concern that has led to the authorization of challenged checkpoints.  
The manner in which courts have assessed the gravity of public concern is 
straightforward and uncontroversial.  After all, it would be nonsensical to 
argue that the issues of border control, drunk driving, narcotics trafficking, 
or gun violence are not grave public concerns.  Not surprisingly, the 
Supreme Court has yet to hold that the gravity of the public concern 
motivating a challenged checkpoint was insufficient under the Brown 
test.160  More troubling, the Court has never described in detail what 
constitutes a “grave public concern.”  Consequently, lower courts have 
nowhere to turn for guidance in judging whether the gravity of public 
concern is sufficient under the Brown test. 
In considering how a court might examine a high-crime area 
checkpoint, it is a near certainty that the criminal activity that is prevalent in 
most urban areas would be considered a grave public concern (including 
gun violence, gang violence, drug trafficking, and prostitution).  
Accordingly, given past Court precedent, the more controversial 
“effectiveness” and “intrusiveness” aspects of the Brown test will be the 
subject of far more scrutiny. 
ii.  Effectiveness 
The second factor considered under the Brown reasonableness test is 
the effectiveness of the checkpoints.  In considering the effectiveness of 
police checkpoints, courts have concluded that while statistical evidence 
can often be instructive, it is not required to establish a checkpoint’s 
 
159 See 443 U.S. 47 (1979).  The police checkpoint cases that have come before the 
Supreme Court since Brown have ended with the Court considering the checkpoints 
reasonable, with the exception being Edmond, where the Brown test was not applied.  Lidster 
IV, 540 U.S. at 426; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
160 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that 
Indianapolis’s determination that checkpoints utilized to stop drug trafficking was a 
legitimate state interest and satisfied the first part of the Brown test). 
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effectiveness.161  As Judge Leon wrote in Mills, “no single type of evidence 
is a touchstone for determining whether a checkpoint is ‘effective.’”162 
When accused of setting up an ineffective checkpoint, the government 
must simply prove that the method chosen is a reasonable law enforcement 
technique and that it furthers the public’s interest in a “sufficiently 
productive” manner.163  As a result of this low bar, every police checkpoint 
to which the Court has applied the Brown test has been deemed 
“effective.”164  The Supreme Court has made clear that judges are not able 
to decide the best means to advance the public interest identified; instead, 
considerable deference must be accorded to “the government officials who 
have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public 
resources.”165 
Thus, despite a fundamental right being at stake, the courts are not 
allowed to stop checkpoints solely on the grounds that, statistically, they 
prove ineffective.  As long as the checkpoints are reasonably tailored to 
advance the program’s purpose, and as long as the checkpoints are 
“sufficiently” productive (although it is not necessarily up to the presiding 
judge to determine what is considered “productive”) then the checkpoints 
pass muster under the “effectiveness” test. 
Judges should be given more credit.  Although showing deference to 
government officials is understandable, if the statistical analysis illustrates 
that a checkpoint has failed to limit illegal border crossings, drunk driving, 
or violent crime in a high-crime area, then a judge should be able to make 
the determination that the checkpoint is ineffective.  At the moment, the test 
requires far too much deference, and the Supreme Court should rectify this 
flaw in the analysis in its next police checkpoint case. 
Notably, even within the D.C. police hierarchy, some dispute the 
effectiveness of high profile police checkpoints in high-crime areas, such as 
those which surrounded Trinidad.166  Kris Baumann, head of the D.C. 
Fraternal Order of Police, argued that the NSZ program would ultimately 
“make policing more difficult by harming the trust between officers and 
 
161 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60 (citing United States v. Bowman, 496 F.3d 685, 693 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he effectiveness or expected effectiveness of the checkpoint . . . may 
be demonstrated in a variety of ways.”)). 
162 Id. at 60. 
163 Id. at 59 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S at 453-54). 
164 See, e.g., Lidster IV, 540 U.S. at 419; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444; United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
165 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454). 
166 See David Nakamura, Police Union Chief: Checkpoints Not Effective, WASH. POST, 
June 10, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2008/06/police_union_chief_check 
points.html. 
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city residents.”167  He noted that, as far as making arrests, the NSZ program 
had “limited or no effectiveness” and worried that the checkpoints were 
“destroying the relations with citizens.”168  In addition, he added that he was 
“getting a lot of calls from officers who [were] concerned that [the 
checkpoint program was] not [c]onstitutional.”169 
This Comment argues that, if this test is to be applied in the future, in-
depth statistical analysis of the effectiveness of checkpoints like those used 
in the D.C. NSZ should be included in the record and noted in future 
opinions.  In addition, the effect that the checkpoints have on police-
resident relations should be taken into account.  These steps would solidify 
the justification for authorizing checkpoints.  They would also provide 
judges with reliable benchmarks to compare the effectiveness of police 
checkpoints in the future.  At the moment, there is no comparison, and there 
is no true scrutiny of the statistical or societal effectiveness of checkpoints.  
As it stands, the effectiveness element of the Brown reasonableness test is 
itself ineffective. 
iii.  Intrusiveness 
The final factor in the Brown reasonableness test is the analysis of the 
intrusiveness of the police checkpoints.  To determine the severity of the 
checkpoint program’s intrusiveness, three criteria are generally considered: 
(1) the “objective” intrusiveness of the checkpoints; (2) the “subjective” 
intrusiveness of the checkpoints; and (3) the level of discretion afforded the 
police officers conducting the checkpoints.170  These three elements of the 
“intrusiveness” prong of the Brown test are examined in detail in the 
following discussion, which focuses particularly on the flaws in the 
“intrusiveness” analysis in Mills, and how the “intrusiveness” analysis 
might be conducted in future cases involving checkpoints surrounding high-
crime neighborhoods. 
a.  Objective Intrusiveness 
A checkpoint’s objective intrusion is “measured by the duration of the 





170 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
171 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452. 
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analysis has typically only examined the intrusiveness of each individual 
stop, not the overall length of the checkpoint program.172 
The district court’s opinion in Mills illustrates a major flaw in the 
“objective intrusiveness” test, particularly when the test is applied to 
checkpoints surrounding a high-crime neighborhood.173  Checkpoints 
surrounding one’s neighborhood present a different set of issues than those 
that have been previously validated by the Supreme Court.  The 
checkpoints that the Supreme Court has authorized are generally of the type 
that one rarely encounters; no one anticipates that drivers are frequently 
crossing the border or being stopped at sobriety checkpoints.174  This likely 
contributes to the Supreme Court’s assumption that the checkpoints are 
minimally intrusive.  But checkpoints at the border and on highways can be 
avoided with knowledge of the checkpoints in a manner that contrasts 
starkly from those that confine a residential neighborhood. 
The D.C. checkpoints were authorized twice in one month.175  The 
second time they were authorized, the Chief of Police approved an 
extension of the checkpoints for up to ten days.176  This would presumably 
lead to the seizure of one’s vehicle multiple times over a period of days, as 
one returned home from work, errands, leisure activity, or visits with family 
and friends outside the neighborhood.  The objective intrusiveness is far 
greater when citizens are being stopped and questioned by the police 
repeatedly.  This is undoubtedly more intrusive police checkpoint behavior 
than has previously been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, and it should be 
treated as such in the future. 
b.  Subjective Intrusiveness 
The second factor considered, the “subjective” intrusiveness of the 
checkpoints, is easily satisfied.  The courts require that those administering 
police checkpoints make an effort to “minimize anxiety, alarm, and fear.”177  
Minimal efforts to ensure that checkpoints are publicized, such as putting 
 
172 See Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Sitz, 496 U.S. 444; United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see also Mills v. District of Columbia 
(Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2008).  In the three major Supreme Court police 
checkpoint cases, the Court examined the intrusiveness of each individual stop in detail, but 
not the overall length of the checkpoint program.  Not surprisingly, Judge Leon followed the 
same formula in Mills I. 
173 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 61. 
174 See Sitz, 496 U.S. 444; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543. 
175 Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 53. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 61 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452).  In Sitz, the Supreme Court noted that the 
potential for “fear and surprise” is minimal where uniformed police officers stopped every 
car. 
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up posters warning motorists approaching the checkpoints that stops are 
imminent or announcing the checkpoints at a news conference, have led 
courts to label checkpoints as minimally intrusive.178  When checkpoints 
stop all passing motorists for inspection, rather than picking cars at random, 
courts also tend to see the stops as minimally intrusive in a subjective 
sense.179  Again, these requirements constitute an incredibly low bar for the 
administrators of police checkpoints to overcome. 
The “subjective intrusiveness” analysis is particularly flawed as 
applied to checkpoints in high-crime neighborhoods.  The analysis by Judge 
Leon of the subjective intrusiveness of the D.C. checkpoints, in which he 
strictly applied tests used by higher courts, illustrates these flaws.  Judge 
Leon concluded that the “subjective intrusiveness” of the D.C. checkpoints 
was minimal.180  He noted that the checkpoints in D.C. were publicized, 
posters were put up that warned motorists approaching the checkpoints that 
a stop was imminent, and all motorists who chose to proceed to the 
checkpoint were stopped.181  He affirmed that these were the kinds of steps 
that the Supreme Court had held minimized anxiety, alarm, and fear.182 
In high-crime neighborhoods, however, the relationship between the 
police and the neighborhood’s residents may be tense.183  While some are 
heartened at the sight of the police, others are instilled with a sense of anger 
and fear, particularly those who have been previously apprehended or who 
know someone who has been arrested or mistreated by the police.184  
Consequently, it is more likely that in a high-crime neighborhood, the sight 
of an increased police presence might increase the level of alarm and 
anxiety one feels as a driver, despite not having committed a crime.  As a 
result, courts should engage in more cogent analysis with regard to which 
police efforts realistically “minimize anxiety, alarm and fear” when 
checkpoints are authorized in high-crime areas. 
c.  Police Discretion 
The third consideration of the intrusiveness test is the level of 
discretion given to the police officers conducting the checkpoints.  
 
178 See United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that 
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184 See id. at 833. 
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Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers.185  Courts consider whether officers manning 
checkpoints have been given specific instructions and training.  If their 
instructions are detailed in a reasonable fashion and the officers have been 
sufficiently trained, then the discretionary standard poses little threat to the 
constitutionality of a checkpoint. 
While the aforementioned limitations on police officers are important 
and well-stated, the potential for abuse of the discretion afforded police 
officers remains extremely high at checkpoints, regardless of the level of 
training and instruction provided.  Giving police officers license to stop 
every driver on the road, without the driver’s consent or an articulated 
reason for suspicion, can lead to friction between driver and officer. 
In high-crime areas like Trinidad, police officers manning checkpoints 
are granted the discretion to arrest when they believe that the drivers are not 
complying with their requests.186  Even with careful instructions, there is 
clearly a danger of abuse of discretion, particularly because the checkpoints 
are located in an area where residents and police often already coexist in a 
state of distrust.187 
In Mills, the district court stated that the NSZ checkpoint program was 
drafted “to minimize the discretion vested with the officers implementing 
the program.”188  The court noted that the Special Orders provided a 
“highly-detailed set of rules” that governed the officers staffing the 
checkpoints.189  The district court also found it persuasive that all of the 
officers were required to complete a training session on the checkpoint 
program before they were allowed to staff a checkpoint.190 
In passing, the district court added that the one instance in which an 
officer retained significant discretion was when an operator’s stated reason 
for entry fell “within an ambiguity in the list of ‘legitimate reasons’ for 
entry.”191  This, however, is the moment where an abuse of discretion is the 
most likely to occur.  The driver’s chances of entry are completely subject 
 
185 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 661 (1979) (finding system of vehicle spot checks unconstitutional on account of 
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Success: Stopping Drivers a Violation of Rights, Some Neighbors Say, WASH. POST, June 8, 
2008, at C1. 
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to the police officer’s discretion.  A law-abiding citizen, in a moment of 
panic, might not provide the answer the police officer is looking for and, as 
a result, be denied entry into his neighborhood.  In fact, he might provide a 
perfectly suitable answer and still be denied entry.  These checkpoint 
programs place far too much power in the hands of the police at the expense 
of citizens, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.  The danger of this 
abuse of discretion should carry more weight in future police checkpoint 
cases if the Brown reasonableness test is to be relied upon. 
B.  A NEW STRICT SCRUTINY TEST IS NEEDED 
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Mills, instituting 
police checkpoints due to a rise in crime is generally not a concept that can 
be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment.192  The Supreme Court has been 
quite clear that it is willing to carve out exceptions to the rules that uphold 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but it has only done so when it 
finds a primary purpose that can be identified as a “special governmental 
need.”193  All governmental needs, however, cannot be treated equally when 
a fundamental right of citizens under the Constitution is at stake.  
Therefore, a new test is needed which will ensure that only those police 
checkpoints that are narrowly tailored to pursue a compelling governmental 
interest are authorized. 
1.  Strict Scrutiny Review 
When police are authorized to conduct “seizures” at checkpoints 
without individualized suspicion or consent, the checkpoints should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny.  Just as “strict scrutiny” tests are applied to 
protect the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of citizens, the Fourth 
Amendment rights of drivers should be similarly protected by a test which 
strictly scrutinizes a severe burden on citizens’ fundamental rights.194  The 
burden imposed by police checkpoints should be considered per se severe.  
Police officers who operate checkpoints are authorized to stop motorists 
 
192 Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
193 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000). 
194 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) 
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without individualized suspicion, and the Fourth Amendment specifically 
forbids this type of burdensome, intrusive behavior.195 
Strict scrutiny review makes sense for two major reasons.  First, this 
type of review is commonly used by judges and its application in other 
contexts has been consistent and reliable.196  The tests currently in place to 
determine the constitutionality of checkpoints have been applied in an 
inconsistent fashion that must not be condoned.  Second, courts are 
currently applying what in reality is a “rational review” analysis, in the 
form of the two-part primary purpose and Brown reasonableness tests.  This 
approach, as the discussion in Part IV has illustrated, does not provide the 
scrutiny necessary to properly protect the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment.  A strict scrutiny test would have the necessary 
teeth to protect the fundamental Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed to 
American citizens (even while driving). 
2.  Would the D.C. Checkpoints Survive Strict Scrutiny? 
It is unlikely that the NSZ checkpoints would prove constitutional 
under a strict scrutiny review, although other high-crime area checkpoints 
might survive.  Under a strict scrutiny review, the first step that D.C. 
officials would have the burden of proving is that the NSZ checkpoints 
were authorized to pursue a compelling governmental interest.  City 
officials could go with a broad or narrow argument or something in 
between.  Broadly, officials could argue that the compelling governmental 
interest at stake is keeping the District’s at-risk neighborhoods safe from 
crime.  Yet, if this interest was accepted as compelling, such a decision 
would force the courts to accept almost all law enforcement objectives as 
“compelling” governmental interests. 
Alternatively, the government could, and likely would, argue that the 
compelling interest is a far narrower one: reducing the number of gun-
related deaths in a high-crime area, for example.  The Court could find that 
this interest is also too general, or too closely tied to the “general interest” 
in crime control, to be considered a compelling interest.  On the other hand, 
it is conceivable that a court might consider the reduction of gun violence in 
a high-crime area a compelling governmental interest, and if so, the Court 
would be forced to move to the second prong of the test. 
 
195 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”). 
196 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:  An Empirical Analysis of 
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The second element of a strict scrutiny review would require the 
government to illustrate how the checkpoints were narrowly tailored to 
pursue the compelling governmental interest.  It is here that the NSZ 
checkpoint program is fatally flawed under a strict scrutiny review.  
Regardless of the compelling interest put forward by the government, the 
checkpoints were not narrowly tailored in a manner that should pass 
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny review. 
There are two major reasons for this argument.  First, the checkpoints 
were over-inclusive, authorizing seizures on every citizen who happens to 
live in the designated high-crime area.197  Strict scrutiny review would 
demand that the checkpoints have more focus and likely require a higher 
level of individualized suspicion.  A program which condones random stops 
of innocent civilians in order to pursue a compelling governmental interest 
(here, ostensibly to prevent gun violence) is, quite simply, not narrowly 
tailored. 
Second, far less intrusive options are available to law enforcement.  
There are other ways to pursue “routine investigative work that the police 
must do every day.”198  Interim D.C. Attorney General Nickles 
acknowledged that city officials had attempted to attack the gun violence 
problem in a variety of less intrusive manners with limited or no success.199  
This acknowledgment, that the city was aware of other available techniques 
that were less intrusive and consistent with the Constitution, would prove 
fatal under the strict scrutiny review. 
Accordingly, under a responsible strict scrutiny test, the NSZ 
checkpoints, and other high-crime area checkpoints fashioned after those 
authorized in the District during the summer of 2008, would not survive 
judicial review.  With that said, one can imagine a checkpoint program that 
survives this type of review.  It would, however, have to operate in a 
fashion that is less intrusive on innocent civilians and be authorized only 
after a determination that no other reasonable alternatives are available.  
Checkpoints should be held to such a standard, in order to ensure the Fourth 
Amendment rights of all citizens, regardless of where they live or drive. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s lack of effective guidance poses a substantial risk to the 
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  In Lidster, the Court 
argued that practical considerations would limit just how extensively police 
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checkpoints would be utilized in the future.200  In the opinion, Justice 
Breyer noted that there was no real threat that police checkpoints would 
become a routine part of American life.201  Yet, in the wake of Lidster and 
Judge Leon’s opinion in Mills, the District of Columbia had the power to 
surround every neighborhood in the nation’s capital with an intrusive police 
barricade in a manner that ran completely contrary to the Framers’ vision of 
privacy.202  The Supreme Court must realize that its past errors in the realm 
of police checkpoint jurisprudence will proliferate as more cities introduce 
intrusive checkpoints in the face of rising crime.  It is the duty of the 
Supreme Court to ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens are 
not violated.  Without a change in direction by the Court, these rights are at 
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